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ESTHER MASON, Business Manager
Publication of signed contributions does not signify adoption of the views ex-
pressed by the REvIEw or its Editors collectively.
"My keenest interest is excited, not by what are called great questions and
great cases, but by little decisions which the common run of selectors would pass by
because they did not deal with the Constitution or a telephone company, yet which
have in them the germ of some wider theory, and therefore of some profound inter-
stitial change in the very tissue of the law."'--OLIVR WENDEL HoiAuEs, COLLECTE
LEdAL PAPERS 269 (1920).
Comments
ADMISSIBILITY OF CONFESSIONS OF GUILT IN MISSOURI
A confession is ordinarily defined as "an acknowledgment by accused in a
criminal case of his guilt of the crime charged."' A mere admission of certain facts
or circumstances connected with the crime or facts from which the guilt of the crime
1. 22 C.J.S., Criminal Law § 816 (1940).
(331)
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might be inferred will not constitute a confession.2 From this it will logically follow
that the confession must be made after the actual crime has been committed,8 and
the confession must be of such a nature that only an inference of complete guilt,
and nothing less, may be drawn therefrom.4
The geatest problem concerning confessions which has eternally plagued our
courts has been whether any given confession is trustworthy. Professor Wigmore has
observed our massive collection of rules restricting the admission of confessions as a
concerted effort on the part of our courts and legislatures to prevent false confes-
sions.5 From this fear of false confessions, emanated our two basic prerequisites of
admissibility, to-wit, that the confessions be voluntary and that they be, to some
extent, corroborated by independent evidence.
There are other circumstances under which a given confession may be false
or unreliable, but these circumstances are much more difficult, if not impossible, to
guard against. Among these situations we find instances in which the confessor
deliberately lies in order to shield the real culprit, or where he has committed one
crime, and, out of hope for leniency, confesses to another similar crime of which
he also has been accused. There is also the possibility that the confessor is suffering
from some mental infirmity which causes him to believe that he really did commit
the crime of which he is accused. A further difficulty in determining the realiability
of confessions is evidenced by the alarming number of persons who allege that they
are guilty of a rather brutal and highly publicized crime which has recently been
committed.
Confessions prompted under the aforementioned circumstances are very difficult
to guard against, and their falsity is often difficult to establish. It is submitted,
though, that these are very exceptional cases, and the fact that men are generally
strongly motivated by the desire for self-protection will operate strongly to prevent
false confessions. Therefore, there is strong justification for admissibility if the re-
quirements of corroboration and lack of coercion are complied with.6
VOLUNrARMSS
In Missouri, as in most jurisdictions, there is a requirement that a confession be
voluntary as a prerequisite to admissibility as evidence of the guilt of the accused.7
For that reason, we will next direct an inquiry as to what factors, if present, will
cause a confession to be deemed involuntary and therefore inadmissible.
Under the McNabb case, it seems that a confession will be deemed inadmissible
in federal courts if illicited while the accused was held improperly, wthout process,
2. State v. Jackson, 95 Mo. 623, 8 S.W. 749 (1888).
3. See note 1 supra.
4. People v. Ferdinand, 194 Cal. 555, 229 Pac. 341 (1924).
5. 3 WrIGORE, EvEN cE § 822 (3d ed. 1940).
6. McCoPzncx, EVIDENcE § 109 (1954).
7. State v. Sanford, 354 Mo. 1012, 193 S.W.2d 35 (1946) (en bane), cert. denied,
328 U.S. 873 (1946); State v. Ellis, 354 Mo. 998, 193 S.W.2d 31 (1946) (en banc).
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and had not been given an opportunity to be taken before a United States judge or
commissioner.8 In Missouri it appears that the fact the accused was under arrest
when the confession was given, does not, in itself, seem to be sufficient to deem it to
be involuntary or cause it to be excluded.9 It may also be said, that, contrary to the
doctrine of the McNabb case, Missouri courts will not deem a confession inadmissible
for the sole reason that the accused was being held illegally when the confession was
illicited.10
In the nineteenth century in England, there was a requirement that the accused
be cautioned as to his rights before making the confession, and if this caution was
insufficient, then the admissibility of the confession might be impaired. 11 In contrast,
such a requirement does not exist in Missouri, and the fact the accused is not warned
that his confession may be used against him will not be sufficient, in itself, to denomi-
nate it as being involuntary, and therefore inadmissible.' 2 Further, the fact that the
accused was neither represented by counsel nor advised that he was entitled to
consult counsel would not, alone, cause a confession given by him to be held involun-
tary and therefore inadmissible.'3
One of the most common factors that will cause a confession to be considered to
have been made involuntarily occurs when the confession is made in reliance upon or
prompted by promises of immunity or reward or some other type of inducement.
Although confessions of this type are usually inadmissible, this cannot be considered
to be categorically true; it is necessary to look to the particular type of promise or
inducement and look to the person making the promise, before its coerciveness can
be accurately determined.
Before a confession will be deemed involuntary because it was induced by a
promise of a future benefit, it is generally felt that the promise must refer to escape
from, or mitigation of punishment for the crime the confessor is accused of com-
mitting.14 Although this be true, the promise need not necessarily refer to a complete
8. McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943).
9. State v. Tillett, 233 S.W.2d 690 (Mo. 1950); State v. Aitkens, 352 Mo. 746, 179
S.W.2d 84 (1944); State v. Pillow, 169 S.W.2d 414 (Mo. 1943); State v. Christup, 337
Mo. 776, 85 S.W.2d 1024 (1935); State v. Bundy, 44 S.W.2d 121 (Mo. 1931); State v.
McGuire, 327 Mo. 1176, 39 S.W.2d 523 (1931); State v. Hoskins, 327 Mo. 313, 36 S.W.2d
909 (1931); State v. McCord, 237 Mo. 242, 140 S.W. 885 (1911); State v. Armstrong,
203 Mo. 554, 102 S.W. 503 (1907).
10. State v. Francies, 295 S.W.2d 8 (Mo. 1956); State v. Bradford, 362 Mo. 226,
240 S.W.2d 930 (1951); State v. Lee, 361 Mo. 163, 233 S.W.2d 666 (1950); State v.
Sanford, supra note 7; State v. Raftery, 252 Mo. 72, 158 S.W. 585 (1913); State v.
Thomas, 250 Mo. 189, 157 S.W. 330 (1913).
11. See 3 WIGmORE, EvnENcE §§ 817-20, 842-47 (3d ed. 1940).
12. State v. Pippin, 357 Mo. 456, 209 S.W.2d 132 (1958); State v. Evans, 345 Mo.
398, 133 S.W.2d 389 (1939); State v. McGuire, supra note 9; State v. Hoskins, supra
note 9; State v. Johnson, 316 Mo. 86, 289 S.W. 847 (1926).
13. State v. Pippin, supra note 12; State v. Evans, supra note 12; State v.
McGuire, supra note 9.
14. State v. Williamson, 339 Mo. 1038, 99 S.W.2d 76 (1936); State v. Ball, 262
S.W. 1043 (Mo. 1924); State v. Hart, 237 S.W. 473 (Mo. 1922); State v. Wooley, 215
Mo. 620, 115 S.W. 417 (1909); State v. Hunter, 181 Mo. 316, 80 S.W. 955 (1904);
State v. Murphey, 146 Mo. App. 707, 125 S.W. 557 (St. L. Ct. App. 1910).
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escape from punishment, but some hope of leniency or clemency has been deemed to
be sufficient.1 5 On the other hand, it appears that a promise merely concerning greater
personal comfort or concerning the granting of some benefit to a third person will
not be sufficient to cause the confession to be considered involuntary.' 0 It is general-
ly felt that the promise need not relate to a specific advantage in order to be inadmis-
sible; it is sufficient if the promise is suggestive enough of advantage to be gained to
induce a hope as to some leniency in punishment for the crime committed, thus
causing the confession to be made.17 The fact that there is some collateral induce-
ment, unrelated to punishment for the crime accused, will not, alone, cause a con-
fession made in reliance thereon to be deemed inadmissible.' 8
One must bear in mind that, in order for a confession to be deemed involuntary
because of a promise of leniency or other related benefit, the promise must be the
factor inducing a confession made in reliance thereon. Therefore, the promise must
be made before the confession is given; if the promise is made subsequent to the con-
fession, it would not render such a confession involuntary.19 It also follows that, in
order for such a promise to be a bar to admissibility, it must be made by someone
having authority in order for it to be reasonable for the accused to believe that the
person making the promise has the power to confer the promised benefit 2 0
Although promises of the aforementioned nature cause a confession to be deemed
involuntary, the fact that the confession was obtained through the use of artifice,
falsehood, deception, or cunning will not affect its admissibility. 2 1 Probably the most
common trick used by law enforcement officers to obtain a confession is that of telling
the accused that his accomplices in the crime have been arrested or that his accom-
plices have already confessed to their participation in the crime and have implicated
the accused. Missouri courts have held that confessions procured through this type of
artifice will not cause the confession to be considered involuntary or inadmissible.2
2
One might conclude, therefore, that if any artifice or falsehood is used, and if such
artifice falls short of being considered a promise or indicement concerning mitiga-
tion of punishment, it will not affect the admissibility of a confession caused there-
by.2a
15. See note 14 supra.
16. State v. King, 342 Mo. 1067, 119 S.W.2d 322 (1938); State v. Williamson,
supra note 14.
17. State v. Williamson, supra note 14.
18. State v. Hopkirk, 84 Mo. 278 (1884).
19. State v. Williamson, supra note 14; State v. Meyer, 293 Mo. 108, 238 S.W.
457 (1922).
20. State v. Williamson, supra note 14; State v. Hart, supra note 14; State v.
Spaugh, 200 Mo. 571, 98 S.W. 55 (1906).
21. State v. Meyer, supra note 19; State v. Wilson, 172 Mo. 420, 72 S.W. 696
(1903) (en bane); State v. Rush, 95 Mo. 199, 8 S.W. 221 (1888); State v. Fredericks,
85 Mo. 145 (1884); State v. Phelps, 74 Mo. 128 (1881); State v. Jones, 54 Mo. 478
(1874).
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Most often confessions are illicited from: the accused by way of normal interroga-
tion by police officers while accused is in custody. In England such confessions would
be inadmissible because of the fact that the practice of the questioning of individuals
in custody charged with a crime by police is not permitted and is looked upon with
great disfavor.24 On the contrary, in Missouri the sole fact that a confession is the
result of reasonable questioning by police officers will not cause it to be inadmissible
provided there is an absence of other factors that would cause the confession to be
involuntarily given.25 On the other hand, it appears that if the questioning is long
and protracted and the police use sweating and other coercive techniques, a sub-
sequent confession extracted in that manner will usually be considered inadmissible
as being involuntary.2 6
Another factor that will often cause a confession to be involuntarily given occurs
when the confession is illicited through threats of bodily harm or by means of
physical violence.2 7 Although Missouri courts have not passed upon a great variety
of situations in which a confession was illicited by threats, it appears that to render a
confession involuntary, the threat must be directed against the confessor rather than
to against a third person. 28 It has also been held that the threat of harm caused by an
outside agency, such as the fear of mob violence, will be sufficient to cause the
confession so elicited to be inadmissible as being given involuntarily. 29 Confessions
elicited by physical violence or by the beating of the accused by police officers have
been considered inadmissible due to their involuntary nature,30 notwithstanding
the fact that such conduct on the part of law enforcement officers is prohibited by
statute.31 It has been further held that a confession prompted by mental punishment
will cause it to be deemed involuntary the same as a confession prompted by
physical violence.32
CORROBORATION
The second great safeguard against the admission of a false confession is the
requirement that a confession in order to be admissible must in some manner be
corroborated by independent evidence. This type of prerequisite will prevent a
mentally deficient person from being convicted of a crime that was never, in fact,
24. Rex v. Treacey, [1944] 2 All E.R. 229 (CA.).
25. State v. Pillow, 169 S.W.2d 414 (Mo. 1943); State v. Hoskins, 327 Mo. 313,
36 S.W.2d 909 (1931); State v. Hart, 237 S.W. 473 (Mo. 1922); State v. Thomas, 250
Mo. 189, 157 S.W. 330 (1913).
26. State v. Butts, 349 Mo. 213, 159 S.W.2d 790 (1942) (continuous questioning
throughout the night and other coercion); State v. Powell, 266 Mo. 100, 180 S.W.
851 (1915) (accused continuously sweated and questioned for twelve hours).
27. State v. Hoskins, supra note 25; State v. Nagle, 326 Mo. 661, 32 S.W.2d 596
(1930); State v. Hart, supra note 25; State v. Wooley, 215 Mo. 620, 115 S.W. 417
(1909); State v. Hopkirk, 84 Mo. 278 (1884); Hector v. State, 2 Mo. 135 (1829).
28. State v. Gibilterra, 342 Mo. 577, 116 S.W.2d 88 (1938).
29. State v. Hart, supra note 25; State v. Moore, 160 Mo. 443, 61 S.W. 199 (1901).
30. State v. Nagle, supra note 27; State v. Hart, supra note 25; State v. Wooley,
supra note 27.
31. § 558.360, RSMo 1949.
32. State v. Bradford, 262 S.W.2d 584 (Mo. 1953).
19581
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committed or, in some jurisdictions, from conviction of a crime that it would be
impossible for the accused to have committed. A few jurisdictions require a full
corroboration, including confirmation of the criminal participation of the accused
himself, but most jurisdictions have a more flexible requirement8 3 For the purposes
of this comment, the discussion will be limited to Missouri's corroborative require-
ments.
In Missouri, it appears the requirements as to corroboration of the confession
will be fully met by independent proof of the corpus delicti. That is to say, in-
dependent proof is required to show that the harm or injury actually occurred, and
that its cause was criminal in origin.3 4 Although this requirement exists, it appears
the corpus delicti need not be fully proved independently, and it will be sufficient
that the outside evidence, together with the confession, proves the guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt.35 It has even been said that only slight corroboration may, in
some circumstances, be sufficient,36 but under any circumstances, it seems well
established that it is only necessary to prove independently that the crime was
committed by someone, and not necessarily that it was committed by the accused.87
One must bear in mind that the preceeding discussion concerning the extent of
corroboration necessarily deals exclusively with the prerequisites to the admissibility
of the confession into evidence. Once the confession has been admitted into
evidence, it is fully within the province of the jury to give as much weight and
credence to the confession as they see fit, in view of all the circumstances.38 For
this reason, it would be most advisable for a prosecutor to corroborate a confession
that has been obtained to as great an extent as possible in order to more fully insure
that he may obtain his desired conviction. Probably the ideal situation, from a
practical point of view, would be one in which the prosecutor could fully sustain his
burden of proof without the use of a confession. That is to say, the confession would
be corroborated to the fullest possible extent; the confession would merely add to
the certainty of the conviction, and the guilt of the accused would have been fully
proven without its use. In that way a subsequent finding by the jury that the con-
fession was involuntarily given would not impair the conviction of the accused, or
the admission of a coerced confession would be less likely to constitute reversible
error.
DETEILIINATION oF ADMIssiBILITY
As to the method by which the question of the admissibility of a given confession
is determined, one may start with the basic proposition that the admissibility of
33. McCoRuMCK, EMVENCE § 110 (1954).
34. State v. Gillman, 329 Mo. 306, 44 S.W.2d 146 (1931).
35. State v. Lyle, 353 Mo. 386, 182 S.W.2d 530 (1944); State v. Meadows, 330
Mo. 1020, 51 S.W.2d 1033 (1932); St. Louis v. Watters, 289 S.W2d 444 (St. L. Ct. App.
1956).
36. State v. McQuinn, 361 Mo. 631, 235 S.W.2d 396 (1951).
37. State v. Hardy, 276 S.W.2d 90 (Mo. 1955) (en banc); State v. Hawkins, 165
S.W.2d 644 (Mo. 1942).
38. State v. Hollenscheit, 61 Mo. 302 (1875); Bower v. State, 5 Mo. 364 (1838).
[Vol. 23
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such evidence is a question of law to be determined by the court. From this genesis,
we find that, in most cases, a simple determination by the court as to the question
of admissibility will not adequately handle the problem and the court, of necessity,
will have to use a more detailed and accurate procedure in order correctly to pass
upon the issue.
As is the case with most areas of evidence, the right to have an inadmissible
confession excluded may be waived by the defendant. For that reason, the defendant
must object to the admissibility of the confession when it is introduced, and failure
to do so will constitute a waiver of his privilege to have it excluded. In Missouri
there is an initial presumption that the confession offered was made voluntarily and
is therefore admissible unless objection is raised.3 9
Usually the defendant will accompany his objection to the introduction of the
confession with a request that the court make a preliminary inquiry as to the
question of admissibility out of the presence of the jury. At this preliminary hearing,
however, the state has the burden of proof in showing that the confession was
voluntarily made and therefore should be admitted into evidence. 4 0 It appears,
therefore, that the presumption that the confession was voluntarily given will exist
only until the defendant objects to its introduction and requests a preliminary hearing
upon the question, after which the state will have to prove its voluntariness.
At the hearing, the state will introduce testimony reflecting how the confession
was obtained, and the defendant has the privilege of introducing evidence in
rebuttal to show the involuntary nature of the confession.4 1 Upon hearing both sides
of the inquiry, the court has the duty of deciding the mixed question of law and
fact as to whether the confession is admissible as being voluntarily given.4 2 If there
is a showing that the confession was involuntarily made, then the court will rule
to exclude it. On the other hand, if it is shown to be voluntary, it will be admitted.
Very often there will be a very close question with respect to voluntariness, and in
such situations the Missouri courts have adopted the practice of submitting the issue
of voluntariness to the jury for their determination.43
If the voluntariness question is to be left to the jury to determine, the state,
once again, will have the burden of proving the voluntary character of the confession
and the accused will have the privilege of introducing evidence in rebuttal.4 4 After
39. State v. Higdon, 356 Mo. 1058, 204 S.W.2d 754 (1947); State v. Roland, 336
Mo. 563, 79 S.W.2d 1050 (1935); State v. Hershon, 329 Mo. 469, 45 S.W.2d 60 (1932);
State v. Midkiff, 278 S.W. 681 (Mo. 1925); State v. Reich, 293 Mo. 415, 239 S.W. 835
(1922); State v. Hart, 237 S.W. 473 (Mo. 1922); State v. Meyers, 99 Mo. 107, 12
S.W. 516 (1889).
40. State v. Bunton, 291 S.W.2d 122 (Mo. 1956); State v. Bradford, 262 S.W.2d
584 (Mo. 1953); State v. Humphrey, 357 Mo. 824, 210 S.W.2d 1002 (1948); State v.
Higdon, supra note 39; State v. Gibilterra, 342 Mo. 577, 116 S.W.2d 88 (1938).
41. State v. Thomas, 250 Mo. 189, 157 S.W. 330 (1913); State v. Kinder, 96 Mo.
548, 10 S.W. 77 (1888).
42. State v. Bradford, 262 S.W.2d 584 (Mo. 1953); State v. Pierce, 236 S.W.2d
314 (Mo. 1951); State v. Humphrey, supra note 40; State v. Di Stefano, 152 S.W.2d
20 (Mo. 1941).
43. State v. Bradford, supra note 42; State v. Di Stefano, supra note 42.
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hearing all the evidence, the jury, during deliberation, will decide the question of
voluntariness and thereby either accept or reject the confession.
Once a confession has been deemed admissible, either by the court or upon
submission to the jury, there still exists the problem of the amount of credence that
will be given thereto by the jury. The fact that the confession is admitted into
evidence does not constitute an automatic command to the jury that they must believe
the substance contained therein. On the contrary, the jury may attach whatever
weight they choose, as to any parts thereof or to the whole confession.45 It is given,
by the law, no greater preference than any other type of proof of guilt. Therefore,
as stated previously, the mere fact that the confession is accepted as evidence, will
not always operate as a complete guaranty of a conviction.
CoNcLusIoNq
As has been pointed out, the greatest danger in the very admissibility of con-
fessions lies in the possibility that the confession may be false. On the other hand,
the strongest reasons for allowing the admissibility of confessions lie in the great
interest in efficient law enforcement and in the necessity that persons guilty of crimes
be convicted and punished. Admittedly, there are many instances in which convic-
tion without the aid of a confession would be virtually impossible because of the
nature of the crime and the difficulty in securing outside, independent evidence
adequate alone to prove guilt.
With this in mind, it can be seen that the ultimate purpose in establishing rules
concerning the admissibility of confessions will be adequate to balance the right
of individuals not to be coerced into confessing crimes which they did not commit,
against the public interest in facilitating and achieving the punishment of criminals.
The result will be that whenever courts act to protect one interest, the action will
usually be at the expense of the other interest, but with a continuing attempt to
achieve an adequate balance of interests at all times.
As to the future of confessions in Missouri, there does not appear to be a definite
trend in one direction or the other. There does not appear to be a tendency to accept
the McNabb doctrine, nor does there appear to be a trend in the direction of liberali-
zing the admissibility requirements of confessions. Any future restrictions upon the
admissibility of confessions would probably be prompted by the use of coercive,
strong-arm tactics by our law enforcement officers in order to obtain confessions
from criminal suspects. It may be concluded, therefore, that as long as the personal
liberties of persons are respected by law enforcement officers and cases of forced
confessions are kept at a minimum, the use of the confession as evidence of guilt will
not be further limited or impaired.
W LIA M. HowmPa
44. See notes 40, 41 supra.
45. See note 38 supra.
[Vol. 23
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INTERPLEADER UNDER THE MIISSOURI CIVIL CODE
HISTORY-EVELOLNT OF THE EQUITABLE REMEDY
In restricted instances the remedy of interpleader was known at early common
law. Since there were many situations in which the use of such a procedure was
justified, and yet the remedy at law was extremely narrow, equity began to take
jurisdiction on the ground that there was no adequate remedy at law. As the
chancellor assumed these cases, the existence of interpleader at law faded away,
and interpleader slowly developed as an equitable remedy.
1
From a purely theoretical point of view equitable interpleader existed in the
situation where the proceeds of a dispute were in the possession of a disinterested
third party. Such a holder, in order to save himself from vexatious multiple litigation,
could file a bill of interpleader in equity, pay the proceeds of the dispute into court,
and compel the litigants to settle the dispute among themselves. The interpleader
had but one obligation which two or more persons claimed. Interpleader was the
solution to his dilemma.
However, as the remedy developed in equity in the 18th and 19th centuries,
certain rigid and strict rules grew up around it which to a great extent impaired
its usefulness. These rules were in the nature of conditions which either had to
exist, or could not exist, before a person would be permitted to interplead. They
were the tests by which the courts determined whether the remedy would lie in
any given case. As these requirements developed and crystallized, interpleader as a
remedy became a complicated, technical problem. The classic statement of these
rules, and the conventional starting point of almost any discussion of interpleader,
is that of Pomeroy:
... from the whole course of authorities, it is clear that the equitable remedy
of interpleader, independent of recent statutory regulations, depends upon
and requires the existence of the four following elements, which may be
regarded as its essential conditions:
1. The same thing, debt, or duty must be claimed by both or all of the parties
against whom relief is demanded [identity];
2. All their adverse titles or claims must be dependent or be derived from a
common source [privity];
3. The person asking the relief-the plaintiff-must not have or claim any
interest in the subject-matter [disinterestedness];
4. He must have incurred no independent liability to either of the claimants;
that is, he must stand perfectly indifferent between them, in the position
merely of a stakeholder [freedom from independent liability]. 2
Pomeroy's statement is the distillation of several centuries of growth and develop-
1. Chafee, Modernizing Interpleader, 30 YAiE L.J. 814 (1921); Buder, Inter-
pleader in Missouri, 7 Mo. L. REv. 203 (1942).
2. 4 PoLiERoy, EQurr JUSISPURDENCE § 1322 (4th ed. 1919).
1958]
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ment of equitable interpleader.3 It represents the pure equitable remedy, without
the impingement of any statutory modification. Many of these requirements were
the result of historical precedent that had carried through the law of interpleader
since its very beginning. Professor Chafee traces the historical basis and tortuous
case growth of each of these elements, attributing some of them, at least, to inarti-
culate attempts by chancellors to express the true nature of interpleader.4 In any
event, as interpleader hardened as a proceeding, these four requisites became the
elements of the remedy. Their very existence hampered the use of this proceeding
as a flexible instrument by which the rights of parties could be finally adjudicated.
A great deal of litigation was precipitated solely over the issue of whether they did
or did not properly exist in a case. Many commentators criticized the continued
application of these tests to the remedy as an unjustified practice;5 and the courts,
in attempts to avoid harsh results in many cases, would circumvent their application,
resulting in difficult and conflicting case law.
Prior to the adoption of the Missouri civil code, the requirements stated by
Pomeroy were applied by Missouri courts. The application of these elements is
discussed in detail in "Interpleader in Missouri,"6 written shortly before the adoption
of the Missouri civil code. The article takes each of the four elements of equitable
interpleader (identity, privity, disinterestedness, and freedom from independent
liability) and discusses the degree to which they were accepted, applied, or rejected
by the Missouri courts.
STATUtORY MODFCATIoN OF IMDPLMER
Interpleader as it finally matured in equity has been subject to extensive statu-
tory modification. The strong criticism against the technical nature of the action
which destroyed much of its flexibility, and the liberalizing Ieffect of modem proce-
dural codes have resulted in a considerable broadening of the remedy.
The Missouri statutory provision on interpleader reads as follows:
Persons having claims against the plaintiff may be joined as defendents
and required to interplead when their claims are such that the plaintiff is or
may be exposed to double or multiple liability. It is not ground for objection
to the joinder that the claims of the several claimants or the titles on which
their claims depend do not have a common origin or are not identical but
3. In addition to these absolute requirements which equity imposed there were
certain other principles which might bar interpleader if they were found to exist in a
given case. Briefly, they were: (1) If either of the two claims were groundless, relief
would be refused; (2) If the applicant was in collusion with either party, relief would
be denied; (3) The res must be put into court or put at the court's disposal; (4) The
applicant must not have been placed in his precarious position through his own fault;
and (5) Equity must have the power to enjoin the claimants from prosecuting their
claims. Chafee, supra note 1, at 819-21.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 822. In one instance Professor Chafee calls these requirements "anti-
quarian and metaphysical incrustations."
6. Supra note 1.
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are adverse to and independent of one another, or that the plaintiff avers that
he is not liable in whole or in part to any or all of the claimants. A defendant
exposed to similar liability may obtain such interpleader by way of cross-
claim or counterclaim. The provisions of this section supplement and do not
in any way limit the joinder of parties permitted in section 507.040.7
This statute is a verbatim copy of rule 22(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. This rule has been said to be the broadest and most liberal interpleader
procedure to be found today.8 And it has been frequently stated that this rule has
abolished all of the technical requirements which equity imposed as a condition
precedent to relief.9 The statute encompasses both the strict bill of interpleader and
the bill in the nature of interpleader as these remedies existed in equity.1 0
An interesting comparison, bearing upon the scope of interpleader in Missouri
today, may be made between the theoretical basis of equitable interpleader and
statutory interpleader. Equitable interpleader was designed for a number of particular
factual situations. A person who found himself in a position in which he owed some
debt or obligation and who was not certain to which of several claimants he was
liable could seek the aid of equity. Statutory interpleader, however, is more of a
procedural joinder device in theory. It includes the situations in which equity would
grant relief but it is much broader in its concept. The committee which drew rule
22 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure said of rule 22:
The first paragraph provides for interpleader relief along the newer and more
liberal lines of joinder in the alternative. It avoids the confusion and
restrictions that developed around actions of strict interpleader and actions
in the nature of interpleader ... 311
Moore in discussing this rule says:
Rule 20 (Permissive Joinder of Parties) authorizes the alternative joinder as
7. § 507.060, RSMo 1949. This section was enacted as part of the Missouri code
for civil procedure becoming effective January 1, 1945. Prior to the adoption of this
section Missouri had passed a number of statutes which dealt with the interpleader
problem. These statutes provided for the remedy of interpleader in specific instances.
They merely supplemented the remedy as it existed in equity and did not materially
change its nature. They are: §§ 362.360, 363.590 (banks and trust companies), 406.170
(wharehousemen), 407.210-230 (carriers), 443.220 (mortgage foreclosure actions),
521.520 (attachments), 525.090, .100, .120 (garnishment), RSMo 1949.
8. CLARK, CODE PLEADING § 66 (2d ed. 1947).
9. 3 Moom, FEDERAL PRACTICs ff 22.04[1], at 3007 (2d ed. 1948); 2 BARRON AND
HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL PACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 551 (1950); Class Actions and Inter-
pleader: California Procedure and Federal Rules, 6 STAN. L. REV. 120, 150 (1953).
10. A bill in the nature of interpleader was a device used to get around some of
the technical requirements of a strict action of interpleader. It was based upon some
other grounds of equity jurisdiction. If an applicant for interpleader could get into
equity on some ground other than double vexation, he could get interpleader without
meeting some or all of the technical requirements.
11. RULES or CIVIr. PROCEDURE, ANOTATED 34 (1938) (advisory committee note
following rule 22). This committee note also appears in 3 MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTIc E
fT 22.01[2J, at 3002 (1948).
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plaintiffs of two or more persons, where they are in doubt as to which one
possesses the right; and the alternative joinder as defendants of two or more
persons, where the plaintiff is in doubt as to which one is liable. Rule 22(1)
authorizes a joinder in the converse situation, where two or more persons
are claiming against a third, and allows the third to obtain a binding declara-
tion of whether he is liable, and if so, to whom and to what extent. Thus it
supplements Rule 20.12
This difference in the rationale between the two types of interpleader should have
some bearing, it would seem, on the scope of interpleader as a remedy today.
Having discussed the historical background of interpleader, and its statutory
modification, the problem to be discussed in this paper may now be presented: What
is the effect on the remedy of interpleader of the adoption of the Missouri statutory
provision on interpleader? The Missouri appellate cases decided since this statute
went into effect supply the answer to this problem.
MIssoURI CASES UNDER THE CIVIL CoDs
Before discussing the case by case development of statutory interpleader in
Missouri, an introduction to terminology will be helpful. Professor Chafee has
originated a method of designating parties which facilitates the discussion of cases
in this field.' 3 The person requesting interpleader is called the applicant (A) and
the parties who are claiming from him are designated claimants (C1, C2, etc.).
The Missouri cases dealing with interpleader are reviewed in the following material
in their chronological order.
The first appellate case concerning the Missouri statutory provision on inter-
pleader (hereafter referred to as section 507.060) and its impact on the remedy
of interpleader in Missouri is John A. Moore & Co. v. McConkey.14 A was a real
estate dealer who was negotiating a contract for the sale of certain real property
between C, and C2. A contract for the sale was signed and earnest money of $5,000
was deposited with A. The parties were thereafter unable to agree on the method
by which the transaction was to be financed, and the time fixed for'closing expired.
Both C, and C2 claimed the fund which A held, each maintaining that he was
entitled to it under the contract of sale. A filed a petition for interpleader, and the
trial court held that A was entitled to interplead the parties. One of the claimants
appealed. The Kansas City Court of Appeals held that interpleader would lie. Since
A was in a position in which both C, and C2 claimed the earnest money from him
and it would have been necessary for him to determine the right party at his peril,
interpleader was the appropriate remedy. As to the nature of interpleader under
the civil code, the court said:
. . . our legislature has, by enactment of Section 18, Laws Missouri 1943,
page 353, [now Missouri Revised Statutes (1949), Section 507.060] . . .
12. 3 MooRE, op. cit. supra note 9, at 3008.
13. Chafee, Modernizing Interpleader, 30 YALE L.J. 814 (1921).
14. 240 Mo. App. 198, 203 S.W.2d 512 (K.C. Ct. App. 1947).
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enlarged the scope of bills of interpleader, and has liberalized the law on
this subject. Section 18, supra, completely abolishes condition 2, as stated
by Pomeroy, and also permits plaintiff to deny liability, in whole or in part,
to any or all of the defendants, thus broadening and liberalizing the remedy
in regard to conditions 3 and 4....
We think that, by Section 18, supra, the forest of confusing judicial pro-
nouncements concerning the law of interpleader has been cleared away....
Reference to the language of Section 18, supra, . . . discloses that most of
the conditions heretofore required to be shown in order to maintain a bill of
interpleader are thereby relegated to the scrap pile of worn out and
abandoned rules no longer deemed suitable for 20th century judicial proce-
dure.
The first sentence of the quoted statute prescribes virtually the sole test
of whether or not a bill of interpleader will lie. The statue does not destroy
or change the nature of the remedy of interpleader as recognized in equity;
it merely broadens its scope.15
The supreme court first considered the effect of interpleader under the new
statute in Barr v. Snyder,16 another case involving an intermediary in a real estate
transaction. C1 and C2, buyer and seller, had signed a contract for the sale of real
estate. A controversy developed over certain furniture in the house. The contract
had provided that C., the buyer, was to receive all the furniture. However, C2,
the seller, removed and sold certain pieces. The parties then requested A to handle
further negotiations and to close the transaction, stating to A that they would settle
the dispute over the furniture. A received the earnest money and certain of the other
necessary papers. Because the fight over the furniture continued, however, the
transfer was never completed. C, sued C2 in conversion, joining A as a defendant. A
filed a defensive interpleader which the trial court allowed. C, appealed, maintaining
that interpleader would not lie. The court, while generally recognizing that the
remedy of interpleader had been expanded in scope by the enactment of section
507.060, reserved the question of the extent of such change. Since the factual
situation presented was one in which interpleader would lie before the passage of
the civil code it was not necessary to the decision to develop at length the extent
of enlargement of interpleader. The case does indicate, however, the feeling of the
court that interpleader in Missouri today is a considerably broader remedy than
as it previously existed.
In Buerger v. Costello,17 an owner of an undivided one half interest in a tenancy
in common had leased the premises to C1. C, then subleased part of the tract, a
service station, to A. C2 , the owner of the other half of the tenancy in common, and
C, both claimed the rent from A. A filed a petition in interpleader against the two
claimants. The circuit court held that interpleader would lie, and C,, A's landlord,
appealed maintaining that a tenant may not interplead his landlord, in an action
involving rent money. There is a great deal of case authority prior to the civil codes
15. Id. at 203, 203 S.W.2d at 514.
16. 358 Mo. 1189, 219 S.W.2d 305 (1949).
17. 240 Mo. App. 1194, 226 S.W.2d 610 (K.C. Ct. App. 1949).
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sustaining the rule that C, urged.' 8 The situation presented to the court was that
covered by Pomeroy's fourth conditional element of equitable interpleader; i.e., that
the applicant must have incurred no independent liability to any of the claimants.19
The Kansas City Court of Appeals held that section 507.060 had abrogated the
necessity for the absence of such liability on the part of the applicant. The court said:
The language quoted is surely broad enough to embrace within its mean-
ing a case involving landlord and tenant; and no other language appears in
the statute which tends to limit it in this respect or to exclude such cases
from its operation.
The following language, however, does appear therein, towit: "It is not
ground for objection to the joinder that . . . the plaintiff avers that he is
not liable in whole or in part to any or all of the claimants." That provision
appears to be definite and clear; and it cannot be said that landlords are
immune from its effect. 2 0
The Beurger case has an important bearing on the problem being considered
in this paper. On facts which are squarely in point it represents a holding that
freedom from independent liability is no longer a conditional requirement of inter-
pleader in Missouri. The significance of the decision will be discussed in the con-
clusion of this article.
In Star-Times Publishing Co. v. Buder,2 1 A, a corporation, found itself in a
position where two rival factions claimed the interest to certain of its stock. Two
brothers, C, and C2, practicing attorneys, had engaged in extensive business and
financial activities together. In 1932 they sold their interest in the St. Louis Times
to A. Part of the shares of the Star-Times which the brothers received in exchange
in the sale had been issued to the wife of C, as trustee without any indication of
who owned the beneficial interest therein. Over the years the relations between the
claimants became strained. In 1943 C, asked A to transfer the share certificates
involved to his three children, stating that the trust had originally been established
for their benefit. C2 maintained that neither Cl's wife nor the children had any
interest in the shares. A filed a petition in interpleader against the two rival fractions
seeking a declaratory judgement respecting the ownership of the stock in question.
There is very little in the case dealing with the effect of the Missouri civil code on
the remedy of interpleader. Almost the entire opinion is devoted to a review of
18. See Annot., 97 A.L.R. 996 (1935).
19. The applicant is liable on some independent ground not directly involved in
the interpleader action to one of the claimants. A simple illustration of this is where
C, steals C2's chattels and bails them to A. A is under a duty to return the property to
C2, the rightful owner. He also has a contract of bailment with C1. He is "inde-
pendently liable" on the contract with C1. If the court allows A to interplead C, and
C2 , there will still be the possibility (provided C, loses in the interpleader suit) of a
separate action between A and C,. If it is not allowed, then A is subject to the
possibility of double liability. Equity would refuse interpleader because A was under
an independent liability to C1.
20. 240 Mo. App. at 1196, 226 S.W.2d at 611.
21. 245 S.W.2d 59 (Mo. 1952).
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the evidence, involving very complicated financial transactions, to determine who
was the owner of the beneficial interest in the stock. Only the last paragraph of the
opinion concerns interpleader as an issue, and here the court simply holds that in
an interpleader action, in the second stage of the trial, each claimant is in effect a
plaintiff who must recover on the strength of his own title and not on the weakness
of that of his adversary.
In Heinrich v. South Side Nat'l Bank,22 the issue presented was when trial court
action in allowing interpleader became final in the sense that such a determination
could be appealed. A, a bank, had the proceeds of a joint bank account in which one
of the joint owners had died. C1, the daughter of the decedent, who was also the
surviving joint owner, brought an action against A for the proceeds of the account.
The bank denied that C1 had a beneficial interest in the account and interpleaded
the beneficiaries under the decedent's will. The trial court sustained the interpleader
and C1 appealed. A's interpleader had been brought under section 362.360, one of
the special interpleader statutes which Missouri had enacted before passage of the
civil code. Under this statute, the interpleader does not have to pay the property
in dispute into court but may refuse to do so and remain a party to the second stage
of the action.23 A maintained on appeal that the action of the trial court was not
an appealable order. The court upheld A, drawing a distinction as to when a trial
court decision in the first stage of an interpleader action is appealable. The basis
of the court's decision was that if the action is allowed and the party pays the
proceeds into court and is dismissed from the proceedings, the court's order allowing
the interplea is appealable. However, if the interpleader has not been discharged
but remains a party to the remainder of the litigation, there is no appealable act.
The basic holding of the court is summed up by its statement to the effect that:
... there can still be no final judgment at the interpleader stage of the case
unless the interpleader as a stakeholder pays the money into court and is
discharged from the case, leaving the interpleaders to litigate for it between
themselves. 24
The supreme court again indicates in general terms its attitude that interpleader
in Missouri has been considerably broadened as a remedy, but does not specifically
define the limits of such change.
The facts in Clay County State Bank v. Simral125 are almost exactly like those
presented in the Heinrich case. C., the survivor of a joint account claimed the fund
which the applicant, a bank, held. The account had been carried in the names of
C1, C1's father, and the father's wife. The father and his wife died. Their estates,
22. 363 Mo. 220, 250 S.W.2d 345 (1952) (en banc).
23. An interpleader suit is actually a two-step proceeding in which three parties
are involved. In the first stage A's right to interpleader is litigated with the arrange-
ment of parties being A against C1 and C2. If A is successful, he is discharged, and
the second stage is between C, and C2 over their respective rights in the disputed
matter.
24. 363 Mo. at 224, 250 S.W.2d at 348.
25. 259 S.W.2d 422 (K.C. Ct. App. 1953).
15
et al.: Editorial Board/Comments
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1958
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
C2 and C3 , also claimed the fund from A. A instituted an interpleader action. It was
allowed by the trial court and C1 appealed. The Kansas City Court of Appeals held
that the case presented was one where interpleader clearly would lie. Without
discussing the nature of the remedy, the court pointed out that A held a fund to
which it asserted no right and which three different parties had claimed. A was
therefore entitled to seek relief from the danger of double recovery for a single
liability.
The next two cases, decided by the supreme court, are the significant cases on
interpleader in Missouri today. The first is St. Louis S.W. Ry. v. Meler.20 A, a
corporation, having declared a dividend of $5 per share on its common stock and
its preferred stock, sought to declare a further dividend of $1 per share on the out-
standing shares of its capital stock. A controversy, betveen the common shareholders,
C,, and the preferred shareholders, C2 , developed as to whether the preferred stock
had a right to participate in the extra dividend. It was not clear under the articles
of incorporation and the share certificates whether the preferred shares should or
should not participate. In the light of the conflicting claims, A set apart sufficient
funds to pay the proposed dividend, and deposited these with a trust company. A
then filed a petition for interpleader against the preferred and common shareholders
individually and as class representatives. The circuit court sustained the petition,
discharge A, and ordered the two contesting groups of shareholders to interplead
as to their respective rights to share in the dividend fund. Some of the common
shareholders, C1, appealed, alleging among other grounds of error, that interpleader
as a remedy did not lie under the facts presented. The court first considered the
nature of the remedy of interpleader under the civil code. It said:
In part the appellants' arguments misconceive the nature of modem
interpleader and the changes wrought by our enactment and recent adoption
in Section 507.060 of Federal Rule 22. Since the questions upon this appeal
arise upon the record and the proof adduced, and not on the pleadings, it is
not necessary to consider, precisely, the nature and characteristics of inter-
pleader under the statute or to attempt specific delimitation. It is sufficient
for the purposes of this opinion to note that certain technical requirements,
previously enforced, have been abolished and the scope of interpleader,
both in form and substance, broadened.2 7
Since, under the facts presented, there was a danger of exposure to multiple
liability against A, the court held that interpleader was the proper remedy.
The remainder of the St. Louis S.W. Ry. case is important in that the court con-
siders at length whether certain equitable considerations will bar interpleader. Given
a fractual situation in which the remedy would ordinarily lie, can the court use its
discretion to bar interpleader because of laches, collusion, or unclean hands? The
answer to this question is yes. The appellant, C1 , urged that interpleader should not
be granted because A had colluded with one of the claimants (its largest stockholder),
26. 364 Mo. 1057, 272 S.W.2d 249 (1954).
27. 364 Mo. at 1071, 272 S.W.2d at 254.
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had itself created the situation in which it was subject to multiple claims, had not
come into equity with clean hands, and was guilty of estoppel and laches. The court
took each of these contentions, examined them at length under the evidence, and
concluded that none of these arguments were supported by the facts. The case, how-
ever, does illustrate that interpleader in Missouri is not alone a matter of procedural
joinder but that the remedy is still inherently equitable in its nature. If the remedy
were not inherently equitable, the court could merely have said that these contentions
did not apply.
The principal case with respect to the effect of the Missouri civil code on the
remedy of interpleader is Plaza Express Co. v. Galloway.28 In cases decided previous
to this case, the supreme court had indicated in general terms its view that inter-
pleader had been considerably broadened in scope by the enactment of section 507.060,
but had never specifically defined the extent of the change. The issue was directly
involved in the facts presented in this case. Bert Galloway had been injured in an
automobile accident in 1951, allegedly due to the negligence of an employee of the
express company. In June 1952 he instituted a personal injury action against the ex-
press company, and its purportedly negligent employee (hereafter referred to jointly
as A). Shortly thereafter the plaintiff died. -In November 1952, C., Bert's widow,
brought an action against A, maintaining that the injury received in the accident
resulted in Bert's death. Then in January 1953, C2, the administrator of Bert's estate,
obtained the substitution of himself in the original action brought by Bert Galloway.
Under the Missouri statutes, an essential element of the administrator's claim is that
the injuries received did not result in the decedents death;29 whereas an essential
element of the widow's claim is that the injuries sustained by the deceased did result
in his death.30 The two actions pending against A were then mutually exclusive in
relation to the question of whether Bert Galloway had died as a result of the injuries
he received. Thus, an essential element necessary to recovery by C, necessarily dis-
proved an essential element of the cause of C2. If Bert Galloway had died as a result
of the accident only the widow could recover; however, if his death was not caused by
the accident only the administrator could bring an action. A, the defendants in the
actions referred to above, brought interpleader, alleging that they were, or might be,
exposed to multiple liability in the absence of a prior determination of whether or not
the death resulted from the injuries Bert Galloway had received. The relief which A
requested was a judicial determination of this question. The trial court dismissed the
interpleader petition, and A appealed.
The supreme court held that interpleader would lie. In one way significant
paragraph it comprehensively covers the effect of the civil code on interpleader.
After setting out section 507.060, Missouri Revised Statutes (1949), it said:
The quoted language is clear and unambiguous. It requires no construc-
tion. The sole question, then, is whether plaintiffs have stated facts authoriz-
28. 365 Mo. 166, 280 S.W.2d 17 (1955) (en banc).
29. § 537.020, RSMo 1949.
30. §§ 537.080-.090, RSMo 1949.
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ing the relief provided for in the statute. As we read the plain language of
this statute, there are only two vital facts which must appear from the
averments in the plaintiffs' statement of their claim. These are that persons
have claims against the plaintiffs, and that those claims are of such a nature
that plaintiffs may be exposed to "double liability." Obviously, "double
liability" means "exposed to double recovery for a single liability." The other
pertinent facts of the statute eliminate the necessity for the existence of facts
and conditions, the existence of which was formerly necessary to the main-
tenance of equitable interpleader or of bills in the nature of interpleader.
Thus is eliminated the necessity that the same thing, debt, or duty be claimed
by each of the parties against whom relief is sought. This, because the section
provides that the claims need not be identical. So, also, it is not necessary
that the claims of the parties be dependent or derived from a common source
because the section specifically provides that the claims may be independent
of one another and that they need not have a common origin. And it is not
necessary that a plaintiff, in order to use the machinery of the section, have
no claim or interest in the subject matter or that he stand perfectly indiffer-
ently between the claimants in the position of a stakeholder. This, because
the section provides that one seeking relief may deny liability to any or all of
the claimants. Thus, while it is clear that the equitable remedies of inter-
pleader and of bills in the nature of interpleader are encompassed within the
provisions of Section 507.060, it seems equally clear that the terms of the
section materially modify and extend those remedies as heretofore recognized
in this state.31
This statement by the court clears away any doubt as to the existence of the equitable
requirements of identity, privity, and denial of liability in Missouri today. These
elements are no longer necessary. The single test for the existence of interpleader, as
phrased by the court is the danger of double recovery for a single liability.
The Plaza Express Co. case contained several other significant points on inter-
pleader which deserve to be noted. The court first held that the doctrine of res
judicata would not protect A. If either C, or C2 succeeded in his claim against A,
the judgement obtained would not be a bar to an action by the other. The claimant
who had not yet recovered was not a party to the action and would not be bound by
the judgment. Therefore, the danger of double liability still existed. Another aspect
of interpleader with which the court dealt is the necessity for the existence of a fund
which may be paid into court. The respondent urged that the remedy would not lie
because under the facts of the case there was no fund in existence and there had been
no offer to pay the proceeds into court. The court held that section 507.060 does not
require the existence of a definite fund. The question also arose as to the right of the
parties to a jury trial in the second stage of the interpleader proceeding. The court
held that since interpleader was an equitable remedy, there was no right to a jury
trial.32 This view has a twofold significance: (1) in an interpleader action under the
Missouri civil code, the parties do not have a right to demand a jury trial; and (2) it
is another clear holding by the court that the remedy of interpleader remains
31. 365 Mo. at 171, 280 S.Wl2d at 20.
32. This aspect of the decision is discussed in two Notes, 54 IxcH. L. REv. 1171
(1956); 1956 WAsH. U.L.Q. 264.
[Vol. 23
18
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 23, Iss. 3 [1958], Art. 5
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol23/iss3/5
COMMENTS
equitable in nature, and that, therefore, equitable considerations may arise as a bar to
the remedy. There is a dissent in the case to the part of the court's opinion which
holds that there is no right to a jury trial. An interesting aspect of the dissenting
opinion is that it points out that perhaps, under modern codes, interpleader is not still
equitable in nature but merely a procedural joinder matter. This view is similiar to
that of the committee which drew federal rule 22.33
Three courts of appeals cases have arisen since the Plaza Express Co. case
was decided. In American Life and Ace. Ins. Co. v. Morris,3 4 A, an insurance com-
pany, had issued a hospital and surgical expenses policy to C1 . C1 became ill and
entered the C2 hospital. Cl's husband executed a purposed assignment of benefits
of the policy to C2 . C1 brought an action in magistrate court where A successfully
joined C2 as a third-party defendant. While an appeal from the magistrate action
was pending, A brought an interpleader proceeding in circuit court maintaining
that the magistrate judgment was not binding on C2 because the magistrate had no
jurisdiction to join a third-party defendant, and that A could still be subjected to
the danger of liability to C2 .
The circuit court dismissed the interpleader action and A appealed. On appeal,
the St. Louis Court of Appeals held that there is no statutory authority for third-
party practice in magistrate court, and that a magistrate is without jurisdiction to
hear such an action. C2 was therefore not bound by the magistrate judgment, and
there existed the possibility that the plaintiff could be held doubly liable on the single
cause of action. This possibility, of course, is the modern test for interpleader and,
since that factual situation existed, A could interplead the claimants.
In Shaw v. Greathouse,3 5 A had damaged a building used as a garage on leased
premises. C1 , the landlord, had filed suit in the magistrate court for the damage to her
interest and C2, the tenant ,was threatening suit for the losses he had incurred. Faced
with multiple claims, A filed a petition in interpleader, maintaining that he might be
exposed to multiple liability. The court first pointed out that a landlord and tenant
each have separate estates for injuries to which each has a separate cause of action.
It concluded that such separate causes of action do not subject the wrongdoer to two
recoveries for a single liability. Rather, the separate legal interests of two different
persons have been injured by the same act and the wrongdoer is liable to make each
whole to the extent of his loss. Interpleader, therefore, did not lie. The case is a
good simple illustration of a factual situation that does not meet the test for inter-
pleader in Missouri today. The analysis which the supreme court adopted in the
Plaza Express Co. case is that one who interpleads must be subject to the possi-
bility of two recoveries for a single liability. The mere fact that a person may be
liable to two or more persons does not establish the right to maintain interpleader.
The most recent Missouri case on interpleader is Badeau v. National Life Acc. Ins.
33. See note 11 supra, and text thereat.
34. 281 S.W.2d 601 (St. L. Ct. App. 1955).
35. 296 S.W.2d 151 (K.C. Ct. App. 1956).
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Co. 6 This case deals almost entirely with the allowance of costs to an interpleader. A
had insured the life of Will Turner, who had died, for $260. C1, a funeral director, had
obtained a probate court order awarding the policy to him, and he sued on the policy.
A interpleaded, and tendered the policy and proceeds into court, maintaining that the
insured's daughter, Rosetta Turner, the named beneficiary, was entitled to the pro-
ceeds. The purported claimant had made no claim on A and A had no knowledge of
her whereabouts. Service by publication was made on Rosetta Turner, as an alleged
C2 . The trial court ordered the costs of the litigation paid from the proceeds of the
policy, and awarded the balance of proceeds to C1. C, appealed maintaining that
the costs should be taxed against A. The usual rule is that a person who has estab-
lished his right to interplead shall be allowed his costs out of the fund deposited in
court. As between the disputed claimants the prevailing party can then usually
recover his costs from the parties who do not support their claims. The court held
that the interpleader action involved was not a proper one in that it was not shown
that the claimant which the interpleader had sought to bring in was in existence and
capable of being interpleaded. Since the interpleader was not properly brought, the
general rule did not apply, and the court held that the prevailing party, C1 was
entitled to his costs from A.
CONCLUSION
Interpleader in Missouri today is a considerably broadened remedy. Many, if not
all of the absolute equitable limitations which restricted its earlier use have been
swept aside. The test for the existence of a factual situation in which the remedy will
lie, as stated by the Missouri supreme court, is that there must be the danger of
double recovery against A for a single liability.37 This test excludes the situation of
simple double liability; i.e., the mere fact that A is liable to two persons does not give
rise to the right to bring an interpleader proceeding.38 It is in the situation in which
A is liable to two or more persons on the one liability that the remedy is applicable.
There is no doubt, however, that the remedy is still equitable in nature, The
Missouri case law since the passage of the civil code has definitely established this as
an inherent characteristic.3 9 While perhaps it could be argued, as suggested by the
advisory committee which drafted federal rule 22, that our interpleader statute which
36. 305 S.W.2d 876 (K.C. Ct. App. 1957).
37. Plaza Express Co. v. Galloway, 365 Mo. 166, 171, 280 S.W.2d 17, 20 (1955) (en
bane); St. Louis S.W. Ry. v. Meyer, 364 Mo. 1057, 272 S.W.2d 249 (1954).
38. Shaw v. Greathouse, supra note 35, is the best example of a factual situation
which illustrates this point. There a tortfeasor was liable to two individuals for his
act. Each of the injured parties had suffered a wrong to his own right. The court held
that interpleader would not lie.
39. Plaza Express Co. v. Galloway, 365 Mo. 166, 280 S.W.2d 17 (1955) (en banc);
St. Louis S.W. Ry. v. Meyer, 364 Mo. 1057, 272 S.W.2d 249 (1954); Barr v. Snyder, 358
Mo. 1189, 219 S.W.2d 305 (1949); Badeau v. National Life and Acc. Ins. Co., 305 S.W.2d
876 (K.C. Ct. App. 1957): Clay County State Bank v. Simrall, 259 S.W.2d 422 (K.C. Ct.
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is similar to rule 22, is purely a procedural joinder law, our courts have not accepted
that view. The principle which the Missouri courts have adopted is that the new
provisions have been imposed over the equitable remedy, considerably liberalizing its
scope, but leaving it equitable in nature. The effect then of section 507.060 is to
abrogate the absolute conditions which were previously applied, and yet to leave
with the courts the discretion to apply certain equitable principles as a possible bar to
the remedy.40 Thus such considerations as laches and collusion among the parties
may still stand as a bar to interpleader today.
One further question remains to be discussed-whether any of the four conditions,
which Pomeroy stated, are still in effect in Missouri today. The first three elements,
identity, privity, and disinterestedness, have clearly been done away with. There
these restrictions on interpleader and the Missouri supreme court has so held.
4 1
These requirements have been replaced by the much simpler and more flexible test
of the danger of double recovery for a single liability. Whether the fourth element,
freedom from independent liability, still exists is a question on which there is some
conflict. Some commentators, although feeling that it should no longer be employed,
question whether the statute expressly did away with this factor.4 2 There is federal
case authority that it still exists under federal rule 22.4 3 The Missouri cases, however,
hold that it no longer exists. The Moore case 4 4 and the Beurger case,45 which is
squarely in point, both hold that freedom from independent liability on A's part is no
longer necessary. The supreme court has cited both of these cases with approval and
its broad language in the Plaza Express Co. case4 6 would seem to imply that all the
absolute equitable requirements, enumerated by Pomeroy, have been swept away by
section 507.060,
EUGENE FELDHAuSEN
THIRD-PARTY PRACTICE IN MISSOURI
INTRODUCTION
The Missouri courts at various times have stated the object of third-party
practice, sometimes called impleading, to be:
40. St. Louis S.W. Ry. v. Meyer, supra note 39 (collusion, laches, estoppel, un-
clean hands); Barr v. Snyder, supra note 39 (whether the dispute was really or
merely colorable); American Life and Acc. Ins. Co. v. Morris, 281 S.W.2d 601 (St. L.
Ct. App. 1955) (laches).
41. Plaza Express Co. v. Galloway, supra note 39.
42. Buder, Interpleader in Missouri, 7 Mo. L. REv. 203 (1942).
43. Hurlbut v. Shell Oil Co., 131 F. Supp. 466 (W.D. La. 1955); Note, 65 YAmE L.J.
715 (1956).
44. John A. Moore & Co. v. McConkey, supra note 39.
45. Beurger v. Costello, 240 Mo. App. 1194, 226 S.W.2d 610 (K.C. Ct. App. 1949).
46. Plaza Express Co. v. Galloway, supra note 39.
21
et al.: Editorial Board/Comments
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1958
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
. . . "to accomplish ultimate justice for all concerned with economy in
litigation and without prejudice to the rights of another.",
and:
* . . "to avoid two actions which should be tried together to save the time
and cost of a reduplication of evidence, to obtain consistent results from
identical or similar evidence. '2
The purpose of this Comment is to review Missouri court decisions involving
this practice and to determine how these objects are being carried out.
Third-party practice apparently is a creature of statute in the United States.8
The Missouri statute involved is section 507.080, Missouri Revised Statutes (1949).
It reads:
1. Before filing his answer, a defendant may move ex parte or, after
the filing of his answer, no notice to the plaintiff, for leave as a third-party
plaintiff to file a petition and serve a summons upon a person not a party
to the action who is or may be liable to him or to the plaintiff for all or
part of the plaintiff's claim against him. If the motion is granted and the
petition is filed and summons served, the person so served, herein called the
third-party defendant, shall make his defenses, counterclaims and cross-
claims against the plaintiff, or any other party as provided in this [civil]
code. The third-party defendant may assert any defenses which the third-
party plaintiff has to the plaintiff's claim. The third-party defendant is bound
by the adjudication of the third-party plaintiff's liability to the plaintiff, as
well as of his own to the plaintiff or to the third-party plaintiff. The plaintiff
may amend his pleadings to assert against the third-party defendant any
claim which the plaintiff might have asserted against the third-party de-
fendant had he been joined originally as a defendant. A third-party defendant
may proceed under this section against any person not a party to the action
who is or may be liable to him or to the third-party plaintiff for all or part
of the claim made in the action against the third-party defendant.
2. When a counterclaim is asserted against a plaintiff, he may cause a
third-party to be brought in under circumstances which under this section
would entitle a defendant to do so.
A few words will be said on the history of this comparatively new type of
practice,4 but the preponderance of material will deal with the interpretation given
the statute by the Missouri courts in the almost 13 years since it became operative.
Some federal cases will be referred to, but since only the Missouri statute is being
considered, Missouri court decisions will be preferred.
1. State en rel. McClure v. Dinwiddie, 358 Mo. 15, 19, 213 S.W.2d 127, 129 (1948)
(en banc); Camden v. St. Louis Pub. Serv. Co., 239 Mo. App. 1199, 1205, 206 S.W.2d
699, 702 (St. L. Ct. App. 1947).
2. Hipp v. Kansas City Pub. Serv. Co., 241 Mo. App. 169, 172, 237 S.W.2d 928.
930 (K.C. Ct. App. 1951).
3. 39 Am. JuR., Parties § 84 (1942).
4. For an excellent history of third-party practice, see 1 Moons, FmznAL
PsAccs § 14.01 (1938).
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The type of practice brought into Missouri courts by section 507.0805 perhaps
can be traced back as far as the old English practice of "vouching to warranty."6
However, our modern statutes probably have as their basis the English third-party
practice and the procedure developed in the American admiralty courts.
The English statute was first passed as part of the Judicature Act of 18737 and
has been amended until it reached its present form.8 Without going into a detailed
analysis of the statute or English cases interpreting it, it probably could be said
that the English statute, even in its present form, is narrower than the Missouri
statute.0
The practice of impleading was adopted on a limited basis in the United States
in 1883 by the old admiralty rule 59.10 This rule was gradually expanded in scope
by court decisions, and now has been replaced by the present rule 56, promulgated
in 1920.
A few states passed statutes providing for third-party practice prior to the
federal rule. For example, there was the New York statute, first passed in 1923; the
Pennsylvania statute, first passed in 1929; and the Wisconsin statute, first passed
in 1915.
Rule 14 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure was promulgated in 1938. The
Missouri statute was taken almost verbatim from federal rule 14 as it existed in
194511 and remains in its original form. However, the federal rule has been amended
5. All statutory references, unless otherwise indicated, are to RSMo 1949.
6. See note 4 supra.
7. Supreme Court of Judicature Act, 1873, 36 & 37 VicT., c. 66, §§ 66, 24(3),
which provided that a defendant could bring in a third party against whom he
claimed a right to contribution or indemnity or "other remedy or relief."
8. BALL, BURNAImm & WATMOUGH, THE ANNuAL PRACTICE, Third Party Procedure,
order XVIA, rule 1, at 295 (Eng. 1939) which provides:
(1) Where in any action a defendant claims as against any person not already a
party to the action (in this Order called the third party)
(a) that he is entitled to contribution or indemnity or
(b) that he is entitled to any relief or remedy relating to or connected with
the original subject-matter of the action and substantially the same
as some relief or remedy claimed by the plaintiff, or
(c) that any question or issue relating to or connected with the said sub-
ject-matter is substantially the same as some question or issue arising
between the plaintiff and the defendant and should properly be deter-
mined not only as between the plaintiff and the defendant but as
between the plaintiff and defendant and the third party or between any
or either of them, the Court or Judge may give leave to the defendant
to issue and serve a 'third-party notice.'
(2) The Court or Judge may give leave to issue and serve a 'third-party notice'
or an ex parte application supported by affidavit, or, where the Court or
Judge directs a summons to the plaintiff to be issued, upon the hearing
of the summons.
9. For a detailed analysis of English decisions under this statute, see 1 MooRE,
FEDERAL PRACTICE § 14.04 (1938).
10. Promulgated March 26, 1883.
11. State ex rel. McClure v. Dinwiddie, 358 Mo. 15, 213 S.W.2d 127 (1948).
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since that time.' 2 These amendments, one, at least, of which seems significant, will
be discussed later in this Comment.
Thus, as has been pointed out, the third-party practice spread from the English
statute, to the Federal admiralty practice, to a few state courts, and finally to the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. It is with this historical background that Missouri
legislators passed what is now section 507.080.
PASSAGE OF THE MISSOURI: STATUTE
The present general Missouri statute on third-party practice was passed in 1943,
to take effect January 1, 1945, as section 20 of the code of civil procedure.1 3 It should
be noted that there has been a limited type of third-party procedure in Missouri
since before 1945 by virtue of what are now sections 73.940, 75.850, and 507.230 which
deal with cities impleading third-parties.
ITERPRETATION OF THE FEDERAL RULE
As mentioned before, the Missouri statute was substantially the same as rule 14
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, as it existed at that time. This, of course,
meant that there were scores of federal cases interpreting the federal rule on third-
party practice, which are applicable to the Missouri statute. However, the value of
these to the Missouri courts was diminished due to the inconsistency of federal
decisions on certain key points.
It has been said that the federal decisions applying rule 14 can be divided into
two classes. One class gives the rule a broad and liberal construction and the other
class gives it a narrow and limited construction.' 4
INTERPRETATION OF THE MISSOURI STATUTE BY MISSOURI COURTS
There was some speculation' 5 (and a few recommendations)16 as to the manner
in which the Missouri courts would interpret their new statute. However, only time
has been able to answer that question and perhaps the final result is not known
as of this date.
One of the most controversial problems facing the courts in regard to third-
12. The principal amendment has been to strike out the words "or to the plain-
tiff" in the first sentence of the rule. The sentence reading "The third-party is
bound by the adjudication of the third-party plaintiff's liability to the plaintiff, as
well as of his own to the plaintiff or to the third-party plaintiff," has been striken
from the federal rules because it states a rule of substantive law and is not within
the scope of a procedural rule. These amendments became effective in 1947. FEDERAL
RULES OF CiviL PROcEDURE 37-38 (rev. ed. 1947).
13. A complete background on the Missouri code of civil procedure is contained
in 1 CPAR, MISSOURI CIVIL PROCEDURE §§ 1, 2 (1947).
14. 1 id. § 69, at 195.
15. See Ruddy, Joinder of Parties, Claims and Counterclaims, 1 J. OF Mo. BAR
85 (1945); Dabbs, Third Party Practice Under Missouri Code and Federal Rules,
2 J. OF Mo. BAR 20 (1946).
16. 1 CARR, MISSOURI CIVL PROCEDURE § 69 (1947).
[Vol. 23
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party practice was the effect it would have on our tort law, particularly in the field
of contribution. By statute in Missouri,17 there can only be contribution between
joint tortfeasors if there is a joint judgment against them.1 8 The introduction of
third-party practice in Missouri raised the question whether this substantive law
had been altered in any manner.
It will be noted that the Missouri statute allows the impleading of a third-party
who is or may be liable to the defendant or to the plaintiff' 9 for all or part of the
plaintiff's claim against defendant. Reading this alone, it would seem that one joint
tortfeasor, who was sued by the injured party, would be able to implead another
joint tortfeasor and thus obtain contribution. This would qualify the right, recognized
under our statute, of the injured party to select the joint tortfeasor against whom he
wishes to obtain judgment.
The federal courts had split upon this precise question in interpreting rule 14.20
There were some in Missouri who felt that the Missouri statute had substantially
changed the right of a wronged party to choose which joint tortfeasor to sue. One
of the strongest advocates of this view was Charles L. Carr in his work, Missouri
Civil Procedure. 2 1 Mr. Carr strongly advised a liberal interpretation of the new
statute, and in conjunction with that view, he felt contribution should be allowed
between joint tortfeasors if the trial court permitted the impleading of the other
tortfeasor. This, he claimed, would be so whether or not the original plaintiff
amended his petition to state a cause of action against the third-party defendant.
It appeared, at least in one case, that the Missouri courts would go along with
Mr. Carr's interpretation. In Camden v. St. Louis Public Service Co.,22 decided in
1947, the St. Louis Court of Appeals approved quotations from Missouri Civil Proce-
dure as stating the effect of the new third-party statute.2 3 However, the case was
decided on different grounds and its approval became only dictum.
17. § 537.060, RSMo (1949) ("defendants in a judgment founded on an action
for the redress of a private wrong shall be subject to contribution, and all other
consequences of such judgment, in the same manner and to the same extent as
defendants in a judgment in an action founded on contract. It shall be lawful for
all persons having a claim or cause of action against two or more joint tortfeasors
or wrongdoers to compound, settle with, and discharge any and every one or more
of said joint tortfeasors or wrongdoers for such sum as such person or persons may
see fit, and to release him or them from all further liability to such person or persons
for such tort or wrong, without impairing the right of such person or persons to
demand and collect the balance of said claim or cause of action from the other joint
tortfeasors or wrongdoers against whom such person or persons has such claim or
cause of action, and not so released").
18. Neal v. Curtis & Co. Mfg. Co., 328 Mo. 389, 41 S.W.2d 543 (1931).
19. As was noted earlier, the words "or to the plaintiff" have been eliminated
from the federal rule. See note 12 supra.
20. See Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 52
F. Supp. 177 (M.D. Ga. 1943). Contra, Satink v. Holland Township, 31 F. Supp. 229
(D.N.J. 1940).
21. 1 CAPa, Missova Cirm PRocED E § 69 (1947).
22. 239 Mo. App. 1199, 206 S.W.2d 699 (St. L. Ct. App. 1947).
23. Id. at 1203, 1204, 206 S.W.2d at 703, 704.
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Then, in 1948, only one year later, the Missouri supreme court, sitting en banc,
handed down what has probably been the most quoted and cited case in regard to
third-party practice in Missouri--State ex rel. McClure v. Dinwiddie.2 4 This was a
mandamus proceeding resulting from an original action by an automobile passenger
against the driver of another car involved in an accident. The defendant driver of
the second automobile moved for leave to implead the driver of the car in which
the plaintiff was a passenger in order to obtain contribution. When the original plain-
tiff objected to this motion, the trial judge refused to rule on it. The mandamus
action was brought to force the trial court to exercise its discretion on the filing
of the motion. 25
In this proceeding the Missouri supreme court considered the third-party statute
at some length and answered several, at that time, unanswered questions. The court
decided first that it should adopt a liberal construction of the statute; however, it
added that it could only interpret the legislation as it was written. It next
observed that the granting of a motion to implead is discretionary with the trial
court, but that it must use its discretion by ruling on the motion. The court then
went on to assert that if a motion to implead was granted and a third-party de-
fendant was brought into the proceeding, it was optional with the original plaintiff
whether he would accept the third-party defendant as his defendant and amend
his petition to state a cause of action against said third-party defendant. The court
also decided that the Missouri third-party statute was only procedural and thus did
not change the substantive law of section 537.060. Therefore, there can be no contribu-
tion among joint tortfeasors unless there is a joint judgment against them. It
follows that the defendant could file a motion to implead a joint tortfeasor subject
to the discretion of the court, and the motion might be granted. However, if the
plaintiff did not amend his petition to state a cause of action against the third-party
defendant, there could be no joint judgment and therefore no contribution.2 0 The
court stated also that even if the plaintiff did amend his petition to add the third-
party defendant as a defendant, any time before final judgment he might release
the third-party defendant, preventing a joint judgment, and, through the force of
the statute, preventing contribution. This line of reasoning meant that in Missouri
a joint tortfeasor could only be offered to the original plaintiff and if he refused to
accept him as defendant, or later dismissed, there could be no contribution.
The language of the court to the effect that there could be no judgment against
a third-party defendant in favor of the plaintiff unless the plaintiff amended his
petition to state a cause of action against the third-party defendant, meant that
when a defendant alleged the third-party defendant to be liable "to the plaintiff,"
the plaintiff must amend or the third-party action is useless. When the original
plaintiff refuses to amend, there must be a claim of liability from the third-party
24. 358 Mo. 15, 213 S.W.2d 127 (1948) (en bane).
25. The trial judge stated that he was in doubt as to relator's right to bring in
the third-party defendant. Id. at 18, 213 S.W.2d at 129.
26. For an objection to this line of reasoning, see 1 CAm, MIssouRI CIVL PRocE-
-n § 69 n.36.1 (1952 Supp).
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defendant to the third-party plaintiff if there is to be a judgment against the third-
party defendant.27 This would seem to make the section of the statute allowing
third-party petitions in cases where the third-party defendant is alleged to be liable
to the plaintiff a rather useless provision, leaving Missouri, in effect, with a statute
similar to the present federal rule which permits a third-party defendant to be
brought into a case only if he is or may be liable to the defendant.
The decision in the McClure case was expressly contrary to Mr. Carr's views,
and he severely criticized the opinion as "frustrating" third-party practice in Mis-
souri.28 His view was not accepted by all Missouri lawyers. 29
Clearly, the McClure case would have no effect on actions where the defendant
properly seeks indemnity for any judgment the original plaintiff should receive from
said defendant, for in that case the defendant can recover his full loss against the
third-party defendant even though there is no judgment by the plaintiff against
the third-party defendant. Thus, a principal was allowed to implead his agent, who
caused a loss to the principal, even though the injured party did not state a cause
of action against the agent.3 0
One interesting case 31 decided shortly before the McClure case, held that where
the defendant alleged the third-party defendant's negligence was the sole proximate
cause of the collision, and the original plaintiff declined to amend her petition to
include the third-party defendant, the trial court was within its discretion in refusing
the application to permit the defendant to file a third-party petition.
A case decided a few years after the McClure case has been said to be contrary
in theory.3 2 This was the case of Hipp v. Kansas City Public Service Co.,3 3 decided
by the Kansas City Court of Appeals in 1951. The defendant in the original action
filed a third-party petition, apparently claiming that the third-party defendant was
liable to the plaintiff. The plaintiff did not amend to state a cause of action against
the third-party defendant. The third-party defendant answered the third-party
plaintiff's claim and filed a counterclaim (which the court referred to as a cross-
claim) against the third-party plaintiff as allowed by the statute. Subsequently, the
original plaintiff settled her claim against the original defendant and dismissed her
action. Defendant, therefore, moved to dismiss the third-party petition and the
counterclaim. The trial court refused to dismiss the counterclaim and judgment was
for the third-party defendant on the counterclaim. This was affirmed by the Kansas
City Court of Appeals which stated that the McClure case was not in point. Perhaps
27. State ex rel. Merino v. Rose, 362 Mo. 181, 240 S.W.2d 705 (1951) (en banc).
28. 1 CAml, Missouni Cv m PnocExas § 69, at 75 (1952 Supp.). For another
criticism of this interpretation, see Crawford, Third Party Practice Under the Mis-
souri Code, 19 U. KAN. Crr= L. REv. 16, 37 (1951).
29. See Volz and Blackmar, Beneficial Aspects of the Civil Code of Missouri,
3 ST. Louis U.L.J. 334, 348 (1955).
30. State ex rel. Algiere v. Russell, 359 Mo. 800, 223 S.W.2d 481 (1949) (en banc).
31. Browne v. Creek, 357 Mo. 576, 209 S.W.2d 900 (1948).
32. 1 CAn, Missomus Civm PROCEDuRE § 69 (1952 Supp.).
33. 241 Mo. App. 169, 237 S.W.2d 928 (K.C. Ct. App. 1951).
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there are some lines of conflict between the two decisions; however it will take
future cases to resolve the problem. A later case decided by the Missouri supreme
court34 approved the Hipp decision, saying, in reference to the counterclaim, "there
was an actual subsisting cause of action presented by the pleadings as between the
third-party plaintiff and the third-party defendant."3 5
Several Missouri cases have dealt with the procedure followed in moving for
leave to file a third-party petition. The third-party claim must be against one not
already a party to the action. 36 However, one modification of that statement might
be mentioned. In a St. Louis Court of Appeals case,37 one of the defendants filed a
third-party petition against four persons, three of them being strangers to the action,
but one of whom was a co-defendant with the third-party plaintiff. The court allowed
this procedure, saying the action against the co-defendant was really a cross-claim,
and that there was no objection to joining all of the claims in one pleading.
The timing of the motion is extremely important as this could easily be sufficient
grounds to reject the motion. The statute allows an ex parte motion before the
answer is filed, but after the answer, there must be notice to the plaintiff.38 Obviously
the motion should be made as soon as possible under the circumstances. The courts
have held that the filing of the motion after the defendant has answered and after
depositions have been taken is timely.39 However, a motion to be permitted to
implead, which was made after the plaintiff had rested has been refused, one reason
for the refusal being that to grant the motion would unduly delay the trial.40
After the motion is filed, the granting of the motion is a matter of discretion with
the trial court.41 The appellate court will not reverse unless it appears from the
whole record that there has been a gross abuse of such discretion.42
If the motion to implead is granted, the defendant must file a petition against the
third-party defendant, setting out a cause of action, or, in other words, a claim upon
which relief may be granted.43
As would be expected, the third-party claim must arise out of the same transac-
tion, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences as the original claim pre-
sented against the defendant.4 4
34. State ex rel. Merino v. Rose, 362 Mo. 181, 240 S.W.2d 705 (1951) (en banc).
35. Id. at 186, 240 S.W.2d at 708.
36. See Biggs v. Crosswhite, 240 Mo. App. 1171, 225 S.W.2d 514 (K.C. Ct. App.
1949).
37. Elzea v. Hammack, 244 S.W.2d 594 (St. L. Ct. App. 1951).
38. See Dennis v. Creek, 211 S.W.2d 59 (K.C. Ct. App. 1948).
39. State ex rel. McClure v. Dinwiddie, 358 Mo. 15, 213 S.W.2d 127 (1948) (en
bane).
40. Biggs v. Crosswhite, supra note 36.
41. State ex rel. McClure v. Dinwiddie, supra note 39.
42. Stanley v. Ray, 220 S.W.2d 75 (Spr. Ct. App. 1949).
43. Byrnes v. Scaggs, 247 S.W.2d 826 (Mo. 1952).
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A copy of the petition along with a summons must be served on the third-party
defendant. It would probably be good practice to serve a copy on the plaintiff as well,
since the plaintiff should be kept informed of the proceedings in the case, but this is
not required. One danger in regard to service was brought out in a 1953 St. Louis
Court of Appeals case.45 In that case the court held that the third-party statute did
not extend the venue statute, 46 and that the service of a summons upon a third-
party defendant in her home county which was not the county where the principal
case was being held, did not confer jurisdiction on the court over said third-party
defendant. The reason for this holding was that a defendant has a right to be sued,
in the county in which he is domiciled, if he is served there. This case treats a third-
party action as distinct from the original proceeding. This holding seems to be
contrary to the majority federal holding that the third-party action is ancillary to
the principal case.47
The third-party defendant must answer the third-party petition and make his
defenses or run the risk of a default judgment. He may assert any defenses which
the third-party plaintiff has to the plaintiffs claim. He may also file counterclaims
and cross-claims, and third-party motions against parties not already in the case,
in accordance with the rules herein discussed. As mentioned before, the plaintiff
may amend his pleadings to assert against the third-party defendant any claim
which the plaintiff might have asserted against the third-party defendant had he
been joined originally as a defendant. It should also be noted that a plaintiff may
file a third-party motion, if a counterclaim is asserted against him.
The third-party statute also contains a provision that the third-party defendant
is bound by the adjudication of the third-party plaintiff's liability to the plaintiff,
as well as of his own to the plaintiff or to the third-party plaintiff. This provision has
been removed from the federal rule on the ground that it stated a rule of substantive
law and had no place in a procedural rule.
One other problem in relation to procedure deals with magistrate courts. By
statute,48 the code of civil procedure in Missouri applies only to the supreme court,
courts of appeal, circuit courts, and common pleas courts. Therefore, there is no
authority for such a procedure as third-party practice in the magistrate courts. 49
The situation is not changed if the magistrate proceeding is appealed to the circuit
court, since the circuit court's jurisdiction on such an appeal is only derivative and
does not exceed that possessed by the magistrate court.50
45. Memphis Bank & Trust Co. v. West, 260 S.W.2d 866 (St. L. Ct. App. 1953).
46. § 508.010, RSMo 1949.
47. 1 MooRE, FEDERAL PRAcTIcE § 14.08, at 781 (1938).
48. § 506.010, RSMo 1949.
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SUGGESTED AxEm. s
There have been certain changes proposed in the present Missouri statute, and a
short discussion of them seems fitting. It has been proposed to amend the statute in
the manner in which the federal rule was amended; i.e., by striking out the words
"or to the plaintiff." As mentioned before, this provision has become no more than
permission for the defendant to offer this type of third-party defendant to the plain-
tiff. Therefore, no great loss would be suffered by the proposed amendment.
One other proposed change is that the granting of the motion to file a third-
party petition be made compulsory instead of being left to the discretion of the court.
It appears that at all times the Missouri courts have used this discretion carefully
and never with gross abuse. Therefore, in the interest of flexibility, which is one of
the strong points of third-party practice, it is submitted that the present rule on this
point will better carry out the objects of Missouri impleader, than would the rule if
it were amended as proposed.51
CONCLUSION
There is clearly some disagreement whether or not the Missouri courts have
been carrying out the purposes of third-party practice as set out at the beginning
of this Comment. It would appear that within the framework of procedural law in
Missouri, and without disturbing substantive law, the purposes have been fulfilled
by the decisions. 52
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51. For a contrary view, see Volz and Blackmar, Beneficial Aspects of the Civit
Code of Missouri, 3 ST. Louis U.L.J. 334, 348 (1955).
52. In agreement is Volz and Blackmar, supra note 51. For contrary views see
1 CAsa, Missomu CivIL PROCEDmUE § 69, at 75 (1952 Supp.), and Crawford, Third Party
Practice Under the Missouri Code, 19 U. KAN. Crry L. REv. 16 (1951).
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